

From: [Moody, Dustin \(Fed\)](#)
To: [Alperin-Sheriff, Jacob \(Fed\)](#); [Bassham, Lawrence E. \(Fed\)](#); [Chen, Lily \(Fed\)](#); [Jordan, Stephen P \(Fed\)](#); [Liu, Yi-Kai \(Fed\)](#); [Miller, Carl A. \(Fed\)](#); [Moody, Dustin \(Fed\)](#); [Peralta, Rene C. \(Fed\)](#); [Perlner, Ray A. \(Fed\)](#); [Smith-Tone, Daniel C. \(Fed\)](#); [Kelsey, John M. \(Fed\)](#)
Subject: FW: Here's text summarizing what we said in our meeting. Note that John will need to expand on his advice regarding "seed expander"
Date: Wednesday, July 19, 2017 8:35:17 AM

Everyone okay with Ray's write-up? We probably need John's write-up explaining his AES seed-expander before we post this...

Dustin

From: Perlner, Ray (Fed)
Sent: Tuesday, July 18, 2017 5:17 PM
To: Moody, Dustin (Fed) <dustin.moody@nist.gov>
Subject: Here's text summarizing what we said in our meeting. Note that John will need to expand on his advice regarding "seed expander"

Q: How should submitters choose symmetric algorithms for their submissions?

A: While NIST will permit submitters to choose any NIST approved cryptographic algorithm for their submission if they feel it is necessary to achieve the desired security and performance, a number of potential submitters have asked us to offer default options for common symmetric cryptographic primitives. As such, here are our suggestions:

- 1) Hash functions: SHA512 is likely sufficient to meet the requirements of any of our five security strength categories and gives good performance in software, especially for 64 bit architectures. Submitters seeking a variable length output or good performance in hardware may instead prefer to use SHAKE256.
- 2) Authenticated encryption: We'd suggest AES256-GCM with a random IV.
- 3) KDFs: Where security proofs can accommodate something that is not indifferntiable from a random oracle, John's AES-based seed-expander will offer excellent performance. Otherwise, KMAC256 will be a good choice.